Motivation
Natural disasters have inflicted serious damage on human life, property and economy. Though many earthquakes occur worldwide on an annual basis and could impair all walks of life in one way or the other, collateral effects resulting from such natural stalemates could be quite detrimental financially and economically. The recent Japanese earthquake has resulted in many such collateral damages that make the disaster particularly significant. On March 11, 2011, a 9.0 magnitude undersea mega thrust earthquake hit Tohoku in Japan. This powerful shock triggered a Tsunami that struck coastlines across the east of the country, leaving thousands death and damaging considerable property. But what appears to have left analysts startled and concerned over the consequences of this earthquake is the nuclear disaster resulting there-from. Recently classified as a level seven event on the International Nuclear Event Scale, the Fukushima nuclear incident now poses a risk equated to the worst nuclear power plant accident in history (Chernobyl disaster). With much uncertainty over how the crisis would be managed; as it was made announced on the April 18, 2011 that it could take about nine months before the Fukushima Daiichi plant is under complete control, it is imperative to investigate how international financial markets have so for reacted.
Therefore the goal of this paper is to examine whether any contagion effect has occurred two months after the Japanese earthquake, tsunami and worst nuclear crisis since the Chernobyl. In other words, we seek to provide evidence as to whether such a disaster has increased the interdependence among financial assets in different countries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 looks at related literature, data is presented and methodology outlined in section 3, we provide empirical analysis in section 4, discuss results in section 5 before concluding with section 6.
Related literature

Literature on effects of financial market integration
Financial integration is widely believed to improve capital allocative efficiency and diversify risks (Demyanyk and Volosovych, 2008; Coulibaly, 2009; Kose et al., 2011) . However, the recent global financial crisis deemed as the worst since the Great Depression has left many analysts concerned about the contagious effects of financial globalization. Though countries in relative financial autarky are almost immune to global financial shocks, they may well fail to reap the benefits of financial globalization; which far outweigh negative feedbacks from contagion. Much literature has been dedicated to potential benefits of financial integration.
With respect to Kose et al. (2011) , financial globalization in theory should facilitate efficient allocation of capital and improve international risks sharing. They further profess that benefits are much greater for developing countries because they are relatively scare in capital and rich in labor availability. According to them, access to foreign capital should enable them grow faster via new sources of investment. On a positive note of financial globalization, they stretch that since developing countries have more volatile output growth than advanced industrial economies; their potential welfare gains from international risk sharing are much greater. It is important to stress an important finding of theirs: with certain identifiable thresholds in variables such as financial depth and institutional quality, the cost-benefit trade-off from financial openness improves significantly once the threshold conditions are met. Much earlier in the literature, Demyanyk and Volosovych (2008) analyzed benefits of financial integration resulting from international risk sharing among 25 European Union (EU) countries. In their case for diversification of risk across EU member states, they point out that if risks are fully shared, the 10 new members joining the EU should have higher gains than the long standing 15 members. It may be interesting to note South Africa as one of the most striking indications for cost and benefits of financial integration. As a country that experienced financial autarky due to the embargo imposed in 1985 and removed in 1993, Coulibaly (2009) found a significant decrease in the rates of investment, capital and output during the embargo period as compare to pre-embargo and post-embargo periods. On the other side of the coin, South Africa could have been somewhat immune to a global financial meltdown during the embargo period.
It follows that, countries in relative financial autarky as less exposed to international shocks. As we have elucidated above that a prime advantage of financial integration is risk diversification, paradoxically increased financial globalization can reduce the scope for risk diversification as integrated markets tend to be more correlated and highly interdependent. From another negative note, as pointed out by Kose et al. (2011) , a country may stand to reap the benefits of financial integration if certain threshold factors like financial depth and institutional quality are met. This stance is shared by Schmukler (2004) who stresses the importance of sound financial fundamentals and strong macroeconomic institutions; the absence of which will decrease the effectiveness of crises management and increase the probability of crises and contagion.
Literature on the link between natural disasters, globalization and crises
In the first part of this literature review, we have presented several benefits of financial integration as well as potential dismays. As such , occurrences or crisis in one country often due to domestic factors (human or natural) could be propagated to other countries through channels of globalization(trade or financial links for instance). There are four main routes via which natural disasters like the Japanese turmoil could lead to crises at a global level.
From a first count, as pointed out by Schmukler (2004) , when a country's financial system is liberalized, it becomes an object of market discipline exercised by both foreign and domestic investors. As such, reactions to unsound fundamentals resulting from natural disasters are not only the concern of domestic investors as in closed economies. If the prospects of resolving the disaster are blur, asymmetric information would lead investors to take irrational decisions that could result in some crisis of global profile depending on how financially integrated the affected country is.
On a second note, international financial market imperfections could arise from a natural disaster, especially herding behavior, speculative attacks, irrational responses...etc. Thus regardless of market fundamentals, investors could speculate against a currency in a wake of natural calamity if they deem the exchange rate unsustainable;
which could lead to self-fulfilling balance-of-payments. The thesis presented by Obstfeld (1986) has been supported by Schmukler (2004) and more recently Asongu (2011a, b) .
Thirdly, even in the presence of sound fundamentals and absence of imperfections in the international capital market after a natural disaster, crises might crop-up due to external factors (Schmukler, 2004) , such as determinants of capital flows (Calvo et al., 1996) and foreign interest rates (Frankel and Rose, 1996) . For example, if the country is foreign capital dependent, shifts in foreign capital after a natural calamity could create financial issues and economic downturns. As pointed out by Frankel and Rose (1996) , foreign interest rates could play an important role in determining the likelihood of financial crises in developing countries.
Last but not the least, according to Schmukler (2004) , natural disasters through financial globalization could lead to crisis by contagion, notable through shocks by real links, financial links and herding behavior or unexplained high correlations. Our focus on this Japanese earthquake will rotate around this fourth example; the definition and elucidation of which are worthwhile.
Literature on the definitions of contagion
Definitions of contagion
There is yet no established consensus on the definition of contagion by With respect to our study, we shall limit ourselves to the third definition of contagion because: (1) our study aims to investigate only a crisis period in the Japanese financial market (as opposed to the first definition); and (2) we have no mastery of what constitute underlying fundamentals of co-movements we are about to investigate (in antagonism to the second definition).
From an empirical standpoint, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) first proposed a methodology for the third definition. They viewed contagion as a significant increase in market co-movements after a shock occurred in one country. Owing to this conception, the condition for contagion is a significant increase in co-movements as a result of a shock in one market; considered the base criterion. It follows that if two markets display a high degree of co-movements during the stability period, even if they are highly correlated during a crisis, if the crisis-correlation is insignificant, contagion has not occurred. Without the presence of a significant increase in correlation during the crisis period, the term "interdependence" is employed to appraise the situation between the two markets.
Channels of contagion
In accordance with Schmukler (2004) , three main channels of contagion have been identified in the literature: (1) through real links which are often tied to trade links.
As an example, if we consider two countries trading together and competing in the same external market, a devaluation of the exchange rate of one country diminishes the other country's competitive advantage. In an attempt to rebalance its external sectors, the losing country would seek to depreciate/devaluate its own currency. (2) Via financial channels especially when two economies are connected through the international financial system. If we consider a leverage institution facing margin calls as an example, if the value of the collateral falls due to a negative shock in country, the institution would be poised to sell some of its holdings in countries not yet affected by the shock in an attempt to increase its initial stock. This response may give rise to ripples of shocks that could engender contagion. (3) Lastly, as a result of herding behavior or panics resulting from asymmetric information, a financial market might transmit shocks across other markets.
Literature on the measure of contagion
Quite a number of methods have been suggested in the literature for measuring the spreading of international shocks across countries. Among these, the most widely applied are cross-market correlation coefficient measures (Lee et al., 2007; Collins and Biekpe, 2003; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; King and Wadhwani, 1990) , volatility analysis based on ARCH and GARCH models (King et al., 1994) , cross-market co-integration vectors changing techniques (Kanas, 1998) and direct estimation of specific transmission mechanisms (Forbes, 2000) . Within the framework of this study, we shall adopt Forbes and Rigobon (2002) in the context of Lee et al. (2007) .
Data and Methodology
Data
As we have earlier emphasized, we aim to investigate the correlations between returns of the Japanese daily stock index (and exchange rate) and 33 other international stock indexes (and exchange rates) returns. Adopting the Japanese equity and foreign exchange markets as the base criterion, we investigate if co-movements among national stock and foreign exchange markets increased significantly after the major earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster. The sample period is partitioned into two sections: the 12-month pre-earthquake period ( shown that using dollar or local indices will produce similar results.
Methodology
Borrowing from Forbes and Rigobon (2002) , contagion is a significant increase in market co-movements after a shock occurred in one country.
The coefficient of correlation is defined as:
Where: 'x' represents the base criterion and 'y' an international market. This correlation coefficient is adjusted in the following manner to take account of heteroscedasticity:
Where:
This measures the change in high period volatility against volatility in the low period.
While the crisis interval is used as the high volatility period, the tranquil or stable period represents the low volatility period. Contagion is eventually measured as the significant increase of adjusted correlation coefficients in time-varying turmoil periods against the stability period.
Borrowing from Lee et al (2007) , the following hypothesis would be tested: Table 1 (March 11, 2010 to March 10, 2011 . The short-term turmoil period is defined as the 1-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to April 10, 2011). The medium-term turmoil period is defined as the 2-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011 . The full period is the stable period plus the medium-term turmoil period. Co: contagion .While "Y" denotes that the test statistics is greater than the critical value and contagion occurred, "N" indicates that the test statistics was less or equal to the critical value and no contagion occurred. Note 3: Correlation coefficients are unadjusted for heteroscedasticity. n.a 0.000 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n. Note 1: *, **, ***: statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Note 2: The table shows conditional (unadjusted) cross-market correlation coefficients (ρ) , adjuster for heteroscedasticity (δ) and standard deviations (σ) for Japan and other stock indexes. The test statistics are obtained from Fisher Z transformations. The stable period is defined as the 12-month pre-earthquake period (March 11, 2010 to March 10, 2011 . The short-term turmoil period is defined as the 1-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to April 10, 2011 . The medium-term turmoil period is defined as the 2-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011 . The full period is the stable period plus the medium-term turmoil period. Co: contagion. While "Y" denotes that the test statistics is greater than the critical value and contagion occurred, "N" indicates that the test statistics was less or equal to the critical value and no contagion occurred. ρ*stp, ρ*mtp, denote adjusted correlation coefficients for the short and medium term periods respectively. δ: correlation coefficient adjuster. Note 3: Correlation coefficients are adjusted for heteroscedasticity using Equation 2. Note 1: *, **, ***: statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. n.a: the presence of zero exchange rate return for all periods of the series.
Empirical Results
Contagion effect in international stock indexes returns after earthquake
Note 2: The table shows conditional (unadjusted) cross-market correlation coefficients (ρ) and standard deviations (σ) for Japan and other stock indexes. The test statistics are obtained from Fisher Z transformations. The stable period is defined as the 12-month pre-earthquake period (March 11, 2010 to March 10, 2011 . The short-term turmoil period is defined as the 1-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to April 10, 2011 . The medium-term turmoil period is defined as the 2-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011 . The full period is the stable period plus the medium-term turmoil period. Co: contagion .While "Y" denotes that the test statistics is greater than the critical value and contagion occurred, "N" indicates that the test statistics was less or equal to the critical value and no contagion occurred. Note 3: Correlation coefficients are unadjusted for heteroscedasticity. (March 11, 2010 to March 10, 2011 . The short-term turmoil period is defined as the 1-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to April 10, 2011 . The medium-term turmoil period is defined as the 2-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011 . The full period is the stable period plus the medium-term turmoil period. Co: contagion .While "Y" denotes that the test statistics is greater than the critical value and contagion occurred, "N" indicates that the test statistics was less or equal to the critical value and no contagion occurred. ρ*stp, ρ*mtp, denote adjusted correlation coefficients for the short and medium term periods respectively. δ: correlation coefficient adjuster. Note 3: Correlation coefficients are adjusted for heteroscedasticity using Equation 2.
Discussion of Results
This study has investigated if the March 2011 Japanese earthquake plus resulting tsunami and nuclear disaster influenced the stability of the correlation structure in international stock and foreign exchange markets.
On a first note, with respect to international stock markets there is strong evidence of contagion in Taiwan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. The effect on Saudi Arabia was not unexpected because; it is one of the four countries from which a large chunk of Japan's imports in raw material originate; beside China, the U.S and Australia.
For the other three, cross-market correlations strengthened only with China and Australia in the short-term, albeit insignificant to account for contagion. An explanation as to why Saudi Arabia was most strongly contaminated both in the immediate and medium terms could be grasped from Japan's boost in fuel imports in substitution to energy provided by wrecked Fukushima nuclear plants. Bahrain being an oil-export driven economy like her sisterly neighboring country Saudi Arabia could not have suffered a different fate. As for Taiwan, Japan is its second largest trading partner and official estimates on the effect of Japanese earthquake on their economy stand at a yearly decline in growth by 0.2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Secondly, international foreign exchange market results indicate no presence of contagion. Admittedly, one would have expected a wide spread disruption to Japan's US$5.5 trillion economy to inevitably affect other countries in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. Regional trade would have been immediately affected by the damage to Japanese ports. Our unexpected findings could be explained from the fact that major Japanese manufacturers of automobiles, semiconductors, computers and other goods immediately took advantage of their international supply chains and production networks; therefore moving production elsewhere in Asia or to North America, where capacity utilization is still low. Also, since Japanese factories generally produce consumer goods rather than intermediate products, disruptions to outbound shipments should not have been expected to seriously affect production processes in other countries.
Conclusion
In this study, we have used unadjusted and adjusted correlation coefficients to test for contagion effects across 33 economies in the aftermath of the Japanese earthquake, ensuing tsunami and worst nuclear crisis in recent history. Results indicate no international foreign exchange market experienced significantly stronger correlations with the Japanese Yen two months down the road. However, for international stock markets, Taiwan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and South Africa experience contagion; consistent with the widely held notion that contagion is mostly a concern for emerging countries.
Seeing with Lee et al. (2007) , the effects of natural disasters on financial markets are important in investment decisions; as the benefits of portfolio diversification are severely limited during periods of high volatility and increased cross-market correlations.
With financial globalization, investors can gain from diversification if returns from financial markets are stable and not correlated. However with volatility spillovers, increase in cross-market correlations exist as a real effect and are not taken into account for asset allocation and portfolio composition.
Our results have two paramount implications. Firstly, we have confirmed existing consensus that in the face of natural crises that could take an international scale, only emerging markets are contagiously affected for the most part. Secondly, we have also shown that international financial market transmissions not only occur during financial crises; natural disaster effects should not be undermined.
